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letter from the editor
Andy Condurache
As the year draws to a close, I find myself reflecting on our recent victories and eager to embark on our 
upcoming initiatives. Building a foundation of risk awareness around the world requires constant adaptation, 
and during the past year PRMIA’s main focus was to redouble its efforts in this regard. We planned. We 
blueprinted and set our course. Then we dove in. 
In the final weeks before the New Year, we were able to launch a brand new certificate program specifically 
tailored to operational risk enthusiasts, the Operational Risk Manager (ORM) Certificate. 
We designed PRMIA’s Operational Risk Manager Certificate to deliver a deep, practical understanding of 
operational risk management frameworks and measurement methodologies in financial institutions. The 
ORM will prepare its successful candidates to implement meaningful risk assessment initiatives, produce 
useful risk management information, and understand basic modeling techniques for operational risk 
measurement. 
Over the next few months PRMIA will complete the update of the Professional Risk Manager (PRM™) 
program. In March of 2015, PRMIA will release The Professional Risk Managers’ Handbook Series - Second 
Edition, and a newly updated exam will be available starting with the 2nd exam schedule in May 2015. In 
addition, the PRMIA Education Committee has recently adopted a plan to revise the PRM syllabus and 
include the latest developments on a yearly basis ensuring that PRM candidates continue to receive the 
most comprehensive, relevant, and highest quality certification available.
In another new feat, PRMIA is in development of a new interactive online study program that will be available 
within a few months after the new PRM Handbook has been rolled out. More details will be available closer 
to the launch of the new syllabus. 
Apart from PRMIA-centric news, in this issue of Intelligent Risk you will find yet another excellent sample of 
relevant and interesting thought leadership articles. These include: 
• An excellent article from Frederico Galizia, on How SIFIs should manage exposure to one another;
• A much timely article on risk culture, by David Ingram, Alice Underwood and Michael Thompson, 
which was also presented at this years ERM Symposium in Chicago in October;  
How should SIFIs manage exposure to one another? 
Federico Galizia
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Andy Condurache
Director of Exams and Publications
letter from the chair
• Preliminary findings from research projects conducted by one of PRMIA’s long time volunteers and 
current PRM Handbook Editor, Elizabeth Sheedy and her colleague Barbara Griffin, on What We 
Know About Risk Culture in Financial Institutions.
• The second part of a two-part feature on the History of Financial Derivatives by Hillary Till
• The final segment of a series of articles on the topic of Extreme Value at Risk (eVaR) by Dr. Frank 
Schmielewski.
• An article on Solvency II by Christoffer Willer, A Case Study Approach on How to Leverage Internal 
Audit for Success by Jason Ackerman and Monica Dalwadi, and the results of the membership 
survey PRMIA has run in 2014. 
For their continuing support and their article “The Top 10 ORSA Pitfalls”, I would like to thank Workiva, our 
sponsors for this issue. 
I would also like to take this opportunity and congratulate our newly elected Association Chair, Justin 
McCarthy. In his Letter from the Chair, Justin shares his strategic vision for PRMIA in 2015.
Finally, I would like to call your attention to the guidelines for submissions at the end of this issue. PRMIA’s 
Intelligent Risk is accepting submissions from all PRMIA members. If you would like to contribute an article, 
we welcome your submission at: iRisk@prmia.org. 
I will now leave you to read on. Please continue to join us as we advance PRMIA and our risk management 
community through the year 2015 and onwards. Happy holidays!
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letter from the chair
Justin McCarthy
Chair
All,
It is with great pleasure that I write this letter for the first edition of iRisk since my assuming the position as 
Chair of the Board of Directors for PRMIA.  It is amongst the highlights of my professional career. I am truly 
honored and I look forward to working with you over the coming year.
Justin McCarthy
PRMIA is poised for a great 2015 and we have prepared for this by reaching out to seek the opinions and 
recommendations of its members though our membership survey. In addition we have taken the time to 
listen to our committed volunteer base and elected leaders through a recent exercise of getting some of 
these together at our Leadership Summit. The Board, senior staff and I are leading a “Next Steps” initiative 
which will result in a formal PRMIA Strategic Plan as an operational program for the coming 3 years.  The 
process for the plan has been underway for a couple of months and will be finalized and presented before 
the membership at large by the end of the first quarter of 2015.
The complexities of PRMIA are several and distinct – we are distinct from others in our member driven 
approach, but we must work hard to make this sustainable.  Our overall strategic planning efforts will strive 
for a level of simplification and the identification of key core principles, programs and constituencies that 
balance these two parts of PRMA. In my role as chairman, these efforts will be concentrated in 5 areas - 
membership development, certification & training, networking & chapter development, business model and 
governance.  These guiding fundamental topics ought to allow for the integration of a sustainable business 
plan guiding the Association into the 3yr. plan and beyond.  I look forward to hearing from you and working 
with you on these developments.
Obviously, I cannot do it alone.  I am very pleased to be joined by the other members of the Executive 
Committee: Robert Reitano (Vice-Chair), Ken Radigan (Treasurer) and Oscar McCarthy (no relation – 
Secretary) and, the remainder of the Board, including Wilson Fyffe, Saurabh Mathur, Pierre-Yves Maurois, 
Faruk Patel, and Ken Yoo and the excellent PRMIA staff in the United States and now also in other global 
locations. Please allow me to grant a special welcome to PYM and Ken who were duly elected during this 
past election cycle.
Thank you for your continued support for PRMIA and for your assistance throughout our strategic planning 
process.  Please don’t hesitate to contact me at chair@prmia.org – your thoughts and guidance on this are 
part of our member led approach.
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PRMIA leadership meets in strategic discussions
On October 1, 2014 the PRMIA Board of Directors, Regional Directors and Senior Staff met in Chicago, 
IL, USA to discuss Board fundamentals and relationships.  While no vote was taken on any specific 
issues, the following summary outlines key points of discussion and potential consensus.
It was generally agreed that the PRMIA Board must “lead the Association with a plan that clearly 
establishes a direction and priorities for the organization.”  Failure to accomplish this over the next 12 
- 24 months could have negative consequences for PRMIA.
After 12 years of growth and activity, PRMIA is at a crossroad. It must determine critical directions 
in membership, membership services, financial stability and future key opportunities in education, 
certification and collaboration. Time will not allow the leaders the luxury of having a wait-and-see 
attitude. Change is advancing at a rapid pace in these areas of activity, as well as the future of technology, 
and its effective use as a tool for communication internationally. As a global association it was agreed 
the Board, leadership and staff must act now.
Participants broke into small groups to address the “best case scenarios” - How will PRMIA change in 
five years? The responses included:
The strategic leadership working group (attendees) concluded on the following strategic planning 
framework of which the Association should continue its focus to include:  Membership, Certification & 
Training (CPE), Networking and Chapter Development, Governance (Underway), Business Plan.
• Oversight of one industry certificate or standard
• Expanded partnering on key issues
• Virtual community
• Broadened membership base
• Clear strategic plan reviewed annually
• A community versus association
• Financially viable and sustainable with a budget of $20 million
• A viable and valuable number of local chapters
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Tom Nelson, an independent association management consultant working with the PRMIA Board and staff 
concluded: 
Kevin M. Cuff, PRMIA’s executive director likewise opined:
It is apparent that the participants - Board Members, Regional Director / Leadership 
and Senior Staff are engaged and dedicated to PRMIA.  There is a sense of ownership 
among all parties to advance PRMIA to a new level.  There is a sense of pride in 
past accomplishments but the belief that we can “do better.”  If the participants at 
this Conference act effectively on the key points of consensus in the next 6 to 12 
months PRMIA will be a different organization in five years.  It will be a force in the 
profession and a leader.  It will achieve a stature in the industry that will exceed 
member expectations.
PRMIA is at a precipice in its future relationship within the crowded professional 
field of risk management.  PRMIA must develop an integrated plan that positions 
a core constituency with core mission with a dedicated and financially committed 
community.  Positioning and marketing the PRMIA story will enhance the commitment 
and drive a message further positioning the Association amongst the community. 
Failing to do so would position the Association to either merge into another like-
minded organization or downsize the commitment professional support in order to 
continue an open exchange of ideas in a reduced manner.
‘‘
‘‘
The PRMIA Board of Directors will continue the deliberations around strategic initiatives when they meet 
in January.  The Board aspires to set an Action Plan around the discussions that will serve the Association 
well into the future.
From left to right: Bob Mark, Saurabh Mathur, Robert Reitano, Ken Radigan, Wilson Fyffe, Justin McCarthy
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How should SIFIs manage exposure to one another?
by Federico Galizia
Global banks are fundamental to the operations of capital markets; they provide infrastructure for 
international flows, enabling governments and corporations to access finance. While fulfilling this role, 
banks become large, interconnected, and a source of systemic risk. We argue that size and systemic 
risk relate closely, and that by managing their exposure to one another, systemically important financial 
institutions (SIFIs) not only reduce vulnerability, but also deploy capital in economically productive 
ways. The analytical tool underlying this argument is economic capital. Implemented and understood 
properly, it establishes an explicit link between systemic risk and SIFIs. 
Economic capital is the maximum potential loss at a given confidence level. The latter is set by the 
target solvency, often expressed in terms of desired rating. SIFIs are very ambitious in terms of solvency 
because their business models rely on an ability to maintain a high rating. Target confidence levels of 
99.95%—or even 99.98%—are the rule, corresponding to probabilities of default between 2 and 5 
basis points. Compare this with notional solvency of 99.90%, which underlies the Basel framework 
for ordinary banks. If one believes the model, there should be no capital set aside against exposure 
to SIFIs because the probability of default of 2 to 5 basis points is lower than the target solvency of 
99.90%. However, SIFIs all target similar confidence levels so they must set aside capital against one 
another.
This reasoning might appear highly theoretical, but it accords with Basel Committee prescriptions 
for large exposures. Whereas limits are set at 25% of capital when it comes to most counterparts, a 
SIFIs maximum exposure to another SIFI is restricted to 15%. Since regulation considers that size and 
systemic risk relate closely, and that SIFIs grow large by trading with one another, a cap on exposure 
reduces systemic risk. 
Left to their own devices, SIFIs might not consider the economic externality that systemic risk represents. 
For any given level of capital, entities targeting a high confidence level seek to achieve it by trading with 
each other since this makes their assets look safer.
introduction
economic capital for SIFIs
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managing exposure to systemic risk
1. Concentration pricing
2. Asymmetric capital requirements
Both the success of the Eurodollar market in London and the more recent boom in derivatives were based 
on the assumption that exposures to entities with negligible risk implied negligible risk for the entity itself. 
Thus, cycles of an institution targeting high creditworthiness, with others trusting it and doing business 
in increasing size, are at the basis of SIFIs growth, and in turn define systemic risk. Economic capital 
models that consider concentration risk might lessen such a cycle, as we explain in the next section.
We believe concentration is the primary determinant of systemic risk. Default of a large entity and the 
ensuing market disruptions are a direct consequence of excessive concentration. SIFIs reduce this risk 
in a number of ways.
Economic capital can be high for one of two reasons: default probability or size of exposure. 
Galizia (2013) analyses a portfolio of very large loans, with low default probability, and much 
smaller loans, with high default probability. When economic capital is measured in basis points for 
unit of exposure, charges for the two categories are of similar order of magnitude. 
SIFIs credit portfolio managers should set schedules so transfer pricing increases with the size 
of exposure, at any rating of a counterpart. This is counterintuitive to the wholesale logic that the 
larger the business, the lower the margins; it turns the business model underlying the Eurodollar 
market on its head. One might argue that collateral posting reduces concentration risk, but we 
suggest pricing achieves the same effect more efficiently.
Regulatory capital, and in particular Risk Weighted Assets (RWAs), are increasingly becoming the 
yardstick against which risk is measured, and for good reason. Even if they overlook concentration, 
RWAs summarize probability of default, confidence level, and loss given default compactly. 
Gradual harmonization of RWA inputs holds the promise of making risk more comparable across 
institutions.
There is nevertheless a hidden fallacy, which is relevant in the case of SIFIs. These institutions 
operate at solvency levels that are higher than everyone else is, and consequently, should record 
higher RWA against each other than in the case of non-systemic entities. A chapter by Magnette in 
Galizia (2013) illustrates the magnitude of this phenomenon. According to his model, an institution 
targeting higher solvency than assumed by Basel should hold two to three times as much capital 
for high investment-grade ratings, whereas for low-grade risks, there is not much difference. 
The growth model of global capital markets has been size and concentration, and for good 
reasons. 
3. Business model
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Global reach, solidity, and the ability to serve the financial needs of governments and corporations 
determine development, without precedents in financial activity. The crisis from which the 
financial sector is emerging has demonstrated the limits of that system, and the risk to leaving out 
economic entities, in particular small business that are key to employment and development. This 
is increasingly recognized by policymakers and in some cases regulators, who have put in place 
more favourable treatment of credit for the small business sector (known as SMEs – small- and 
medium-sized enterprises).
SIFIs choosing to focus on SMEs—for example, some of the leading commercial banks with 
regional or even global reaches—might be incentivized to increase exposure to granular portfolios 
and move away from large concentrations of corporates and financial institutions that harm 
their solvency at high confidence levels. A proper economic capital measure should provide the 
motivation to do so.
conclusion
references
Leaning primarily on economic capital models, we argue that size concentration is a key determinant of 
systemic risk, and SIFIs should avoid building large exposures to one another. A limit of this prescription 
is that it is based on “tail risk” reasoning and therefore is unlikely to be palatable to decision-makers who 
focus on “average risk.” The question for supervisors is whether requirements for SIFIs should not include 
the ability to manage tail risks.
Galizia (2013) ed., “Managing Systemic Exposure: A risk management 
framework for SIFIs and their markets”, Risk Books. 
Federico Galizia is head of risk and portfolio management at the European 
Investment Fund, a supranational institution dedicated to small business finance. 
Previous appointments include the International Monetary Fund, where he led a 
team monitoring systemic banks during the crisis, and the European Investment 
Bank as the adviser to the President.  Federico has contributed to MBA teaching 
and academic publications, designed financial instruments for policy purposes and 
developed an array of rating and portfolio management methodologies. 
He holds a PhD in economics from Yale University and started his business career with McKinsey.
author
Federico Galizia
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by Kevin M. Cuff & Justin McCarthy
PRMIA C-Suite series
On October 16, 2014, PRMIA (through a generous 
grant from Accenture) hosted nearly 30 C-Suite 
level executives from throughout London to 
address the focal risk issues of the day.   Dr. David 
Rowe, Senior Strategist for Risk & Regulation at 
Misys – served as the Moderator.    The half-day 
session was conducted under Chatham House 
Rules with full disclosure and complete confidence 
through the ease of comment and conversation.
The Moderator broke the session down into two 
parts:  issues reflecting the instrumental practices 
of risk management “hot topics of the day” and the 
topographical of geopolitics of a complex society. 
Both discussions were extremely informative and 
provocative.  
Through vibrant arguments and cross-
examination of market reactions to stress testing, 
capital adequacy and liquidity, the attendees 
concluded that the overall complexities and 
misunderstandings of an unknown regulatory 
environment assured the continued concentration 
of legal review and compliance.  In addition, 
growing global cyber threats added to perceived 
operational deficiencies, blurring financial interest 
towards protection and away from building 
business opportunity.
The session really came to life as the attendees 
debated the UK constitutional vote (Scotland) and 
the renewed considerations of the future of the 
Eurozone.  Although the session occurred post 
the Scottish poll, the attendees of the session 
weighed the potentials and variations of the Euro’s 
economic future.  Iraq, Syria, Ukraine, Baltics, 
falling oil prices, and the internal Chinese political 
crisis over Hong Kong led to a prolonged sense to 
the global discussion.
PRMIA continues to actively solicit and support 
the growing C-Suite membership through events, 
membership offerings and additional dialogue and 
debate.  The Committee has set an ambitious 
agenda of two C-Suite events in NYC and two in 
London to additionally support the activity.
geopolitical and instrumental risk issues of the year
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risk culture 
by David Ingram, Alice Underwood  & Michael Thompson
1 2 3
risk culture, neoclassical economics, and enterprise 
risk management
Risk Culture has become the explanation of last resort for the choices and behaviors that fed the 
financial crisis of the last decade. Because other explanations – economic, demographic, organizational 
and so on – proved inadequate, the conclusion seems to be that culture must have been the driver. 
Hence the talk about the need for a “change of culture”.
Among regulators and quasi-regulators such as rating agencies that oversee the financial sector (and 
in particular the insurance industry), a consensus of sorts has formed about what cultural change 
is needed.  This consensus emerges in the form of ten practices that firms are urged to adopt and 
regulators to assess when evaluating the viability of a firm’s risk management.
Weaknesses in risk culture are often considered a root cause of the global financial 
crisis, headline risk and compliance events. A financial institution’s risk culture 
plays an important role in influencing the actions and decisions taken by individuals 
within the institution and in shaping the institution’s attitude toward its stakeholders, 
including its supervisors.4“
‘‘
1 / David Ingram, CERA, FRM, PRM is Executive Vice President, Willis Re in New York.  He can be reached at dave.ingram@willis.com
2 / Alice Underwood, PhD, FCAS, CERA is Executive Vice President, Willis Re in New York. She can be reached at alice.underwood@willis.com
3 / Michael Thompson, PhD, is a writer and senior research scholar affiliated with the risk and vulnerability program at the International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Laxenburg, Austria. He can be reached at thompson@IIASA.ac.at
4 / Financial Stability Board, Guidance on Supervisory Interaction with Financial Institutions on Risk Culture: A Framework for Assessing Risk Culture (2014)
5 / These ten principles can be observed in the FSB paper cited above, the ORSA Guidance Manual of the NAIC (2013), A.M. Best’s Risk Management and the 
Insurance Rating Process (2008), and S&P’s Insurance Criteria: Evaluating the Enterprise Risk Management Practices of Insurance Companies 
012 Intelligent Risk - December, 2014 
Commonly recommended practices for healthy risk culture 
1 Risk Governance Involvement of the board in risk management
2 Risk Appetite Clear statement of risk that the organization is willing to accept
3 Compensation
Incentive compensation does not conflict with goals of risk 
management
4 Tone at the Top
Board and top management are publicly vocal in support of risk 
management
5 Accountability Individuals held accountable for violations of risk limits
6 Challenge It is acceptable to publicly disagree with risk assessments
7 Risk Organization
Individuals assigned specific roles to facilitate the risk 
management program, including a lead risk officer
8
Communication and 
Participation
Risk management is everyone’s job, and everyone knows what 
is happening
9
Link to Strategy and 
Planning
Risk management program consistent with company strategy; 
planning considers risk information
10
Separate Measurement 
and Management of Risk
No one assesses their own performance regarding risk and risk 
management
But, as we will show, adoption of these ten practices will not change organizational risk culture. 
what is culture?
According to anthropologists, whose profession is to study “social solidarities” – different ways in which people 
bind themselves to one another – and their interactions, definitions of the term “culture” fall into two classes: 
One views culture as composed of values, beliefs, norms, rationalizations, symbols, 
ideologies, i.e. mental products.  The other sees culture as the total way of life of a 
people, their interpersonal relations as well as their attitudes.”6
‘‘
5 / These ten principles can be observed in the FSB paper cited above, the ORSA Guidance Manual of the NAIC (2013), A.M. Best’s Risk Management and the Insurance Rating 
Process (2008), and S&P’s Insurance Criteria: Evaluating the Enterprise Risk Management Practices of Insurance Companies
6 / Thompson et al, Cultural Theory (1990)
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underlying beliefs in the financial sector  
Many people in the financial sector received an introduction to a commonly adopted set of beliefs in 
undergraduate economics.  A short list of such beliefs includes:
Business schools have a strong tendency to reinforce these beliefs, which are part of the canon of neoclassical 
economics.  Weintraub summarizes the three fundamental assumptions of neoclassical economics (NCE) as 
rational preferences, maximization of utility for individuals and profits for firms, and independent actions based 
on full and relevant information.8
This paradigm tends to dominate financial-sector businesses, and has typically produced favorable results. 
The exceptions, however, take the form of major disruptions to the economy.  Some have suggested that the 
2007-2008 financial crisis is evidence of failure of these beliefs.
Both sets of definitions include biases and motivations underlying each solidarity, along with the practices 
those biases and motivations render rational. For Edgar Schein – a theorist of business organization –these 
“underlying assumptions” are culture’s ultimate drivers: “The essence of culture is then the jointly learned 
values and beliefs that work so well that they become taken for granted and non-negotiable 7”.
• Rational expectations (Lucas)
• Utility theory (Von Neumann–Morgenstern)
•  Shareholder value maximization (Friedman)
•  Efficient markets (Fama)
•  General equilibrium (Walras)
•  Law of one price (Arrow and Debreu)
7 / Schein, Edgar H. The Corporate Culture Survival Guide (2009)
8 / Weintraub, E. Roy (2002). “Neoclassical Economics,” in David R. Henderson (ed.), Concise Encyclopedia of Economics, Library of Economics and Liberty
9 / Paul Krugman, New York Times, 2009, How did economists get it so wrong? 
As I see it, the economics profession went astray because economists, as a group, 
mistook beauty, clad in impressive-looking mathematics, for truth.  Until the Great 
Depression, most economists clung to a vision of capitalism as a perfect or nearly 
perfect system.  That vision wasn’t sustainable in the face of mass unemployment, 
but as memories of the Depression faded, economists fell back in love with the 
old, idealized vision of an economy in which rational individuals interact in perfect 
markets, this time gussied up with fancy equations. The renewed romance with the 
idealized market was, to be sure, partly a response to shifting political winds, partly 
a response to financial incentives9.”
‘‘
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underlying beliefs of enterprise risk management
What, then, are the beliefs that underlie the discipline of enterprise risk management (ERM)?  In comparison 
with the beliefs of neoclassical economics, there has not been much development of a formal theoretical 
framework for ERM.  However, the following ideas are implicit in most published ERM guidelines and best 
practices:
•  The world is dangerous enough that we are motivated to control risks, and also predictable 
enough that systematic management and exploitation of risk can be worthwhile
•  Preferences for risk and reward are asymmetrical: the aversion to a large potential loss is always 
higher than the preference for the same sized potential gain
• Focus on maximizing short-term profits
•  Reliance on the prevailing market impression of risk  
•  Highly compliance-driven approach to risk management  
•  High reliance on accounting standards for assessing the financial benefits of actions  
•  Low communication of risk management information
•  Reliance on the market to validate any business strategy  
•  Rewarding improvement in the company’s short-term results without regard to long-term implications
10 / See “University economics teaching isn’t an education: it’s a £9,000 lobotomy”, Aditya Chakrabortty, The Guardian, 8 May 2014 and also “Manchester students man the 
barricades to overthrow economic orthodoxy”, Ben Chu, The Independent, 26 April 2014
11 / Methodology of Positive Economics, Milton Friedman, University of Chicago Press, 1953
12 / For example: Senior Supervisors Group, Observations on Risk Management Practices during the Recent Market Turbulence (2008); What Happened to Goldman Sachs, 
Steven Mandis (2014); Fatal Risk: A Cautionary Tale of AIG’s Corporate Suicide, Roddy Boyd (2010)
And yet these ideas are so entrenched in business schools and university economics departments that 
recent requests from students for exposure to alternate theories of economics have been firmly rebuffed.11 
Milton Friedman provided the ultimate defense against the incursion of disconfirming facts when he famously 
asserted that “a theory cannot be tested by comparing its assumptions directly with reality.”11
The risk management practices of banks and insurers that were harmed by the events of 2007-2008 are 
documented in many sources.12 Those practices include:
Many of these practices would be extinguished or greatly diminished if the 10 Healthy Risk Culture Practices 
were adopted and consistently followed.
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•  Opportunities for profit via risk-taking exist because firms can find opportunities to exploit risks 
that the market has mispriced, and/or opportunities to exploit diversification effects 
•  It is bad for organizations to fail, so risk management objectives should be a part of all company 
strategies and should involve the company’s CEO and board of directors
•  Risks can and should be measured; this measurement is a technical exercise that requires 
expertise
•  Management of risk requires diligent attention to any choices to accept risks and actions to 
mitigate or transfer risk; more significant risk decisions should be approved at more senior levels 
of the company hierarchy
ERM and NCE beliefs 
Comparison of these ERM beliefs with the NCE framework readily reveals conflicts.  Fundamentally, NCE does 
not suggest that companies should expend resources to manage risks; rather, investors can more efficiently 
manage the risks of their investments at a portfolio level.  Under NCE, failure of a firm is not intrinsically 
problematic: in fact, it is better for the system that less profitable firms fail so that their resources can be 
redeployed to other activities.  Because NCE investors diversify the intrinsic risks of individual investments 
across their portfolio, the costs of a few firm failures will in the end be much less than the cost of every firm 
performing risk mitigation to reduce their own individual likelihood of failure.
Let’s compare the ten recommended Risk Culture practices identified and encouraged by the Financial 
Stability Board, National Association of Insurance Commissioners, A.M. Best and Standard & Poor’s with the 
beliefs of ERM and NCE.
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Commonly recommended practices for healthy risk culture 
Risk Culture 
Practices
ERM Principles NCE Principles13
1 Risk Governance
Firm survival should be the 
primary responsibility of the 
board; involvement in risk 
management supports that 
goal
Board should represent shareholder 
interests, generally best served 
without the costs of risk management
2 Risk Appetite
Systematic management 
and exploitation of risk is 
worthwhile; preferences 
for risk and reward are 
asymmetrical
Should be willing to accept any risk 
that will enhance shareholder value
3 Compensation
Unwisely constructed 
incentives can encourage 
increased risk-taking 
without regard to firm’s 
survival or its asymmetrical 
risk/reward preferences  
Incentives should align interests of 
management as rational actors with 
those of the shareholders as rational 
actors, i.e. to increase value
4 Tone at the Top
Firm survival should be the 
primary responsibility of the 
board and management; 
involvement in risk 
management supports that 
goal
Board  and management should 
represent shareholder interests, 
generally best served without the 
costs of risk management; leadership 
and employees will act rationally
5 Accountability
Need for diligent attention 
to risk; more significant 
risk decisions should be 
approved at more senior 
levels of the company 
hierarchy
Should be willing to accept any risk 
that will enhance shareholder value; 
those closest to the market are best 
able to judge value
6 Challenge
Discussion is healthy to 
ensure that the best risk 
measurements and ideas 
are applied by the best-
qualified experts 
The market assesses risk and 
sets a price that incorporates all 
available information; no discussion is 
necessary
7 Risk Organization
Need for diligent attention 
to risk; more significant 
risk decisions should be 
approved at more senior 
levels of the company 
hierarchy
Risk management within the firm 
is not usually in the shareholder’s 
interests; how would these individuals 
and activities add to shareholder 
value?  
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8
Communication and 
Participation
Making risk management 
everyone’s job is the 
best way to assure risk 
is properly controlled; 
transparency increases 
likelihood that risk 
management policies will 
be honored  
Risk management should be 
restricted to activities that clearly 
enhance shareholder value and those 
specifically required by regulators; 
communication should be on a “need 
to know” basis to avoid distracting 
productive employees
9
Link to Strategy and 
Planning
Supports the prevention of 
corporate failure
Corporate strategies and plans 
should focus on increasing 
shareholder value; therefore, risk 
management should be restricted 
to activities that clearly enhance 
shareholder value and those 
specifically required by regulators
10
Separate 
Measurement and 
Management of Risk
Risks can and should 
be measured; this 
measurement is a technical 
exercise that requires 
expertise and should be 
performed impartially
Growth in shareholder value is 
the only important measure of 
the effectiveness of management 
decisions
Commonly recommended practices for healthy risk culture (continued)
Risk Culture 
Practices
ERM Principles NCE Principles13
This comparison illustrates that, while the underlying beliefs of NCE do not support the Risk Culture practices 
favored by regulators, these Risk Culture practices are consistent with the ERM beliefs.  
That does not mean, however, that NCE and ERM cannot productively co-exist within a firm.  Many companies 
employ pricing strategies and mark-to-market accounting techniques that are consistent with NCE alongside 
risk management practices that are consistent with the ERM principles.  In other words, the corporate culture 
is not necessarily monolithic. 
Such an observation, while at odds with much work on corporate culture – which assumes that an organization 
has a single culture – would not surprise anthropologists.  They recognize that culture is rarely unitary and 
never static.  Indeed, their theory of plural rationality predicts four main categories of risk beliefs and strategies, 
each associated with a particular social solidarity, with real-world organizations typically being hybrids of two 
or more of these categories.  
13 / Adapted from the beliefs cited above
14 / In addition, we do not distinguish between Risk Culture and Corporate Culture.  Within a single culture, they are inseparable.  When they appear distinct, it is because there 
are two separate subcultures within the organization.
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To date, our studies show that insurer management typically exhibits heterogeneous risk beliefs, and insurers 
often apply the full range of risk strategies. Among the insurance managers, boards and employees that we 
have assessed, over 50 percent hold a view consistent with NCE, ERM or a blend of the two, with the hybrid 
NCE/ERM view of risk being more common than either view alone15.  
Proponents of plural rationality argue that heterogeneity, contention and ongoing change are not only expected, 
they are healthy and desirable16. In this light, it seems reasonable to question whether the regulators’ approach 
– recommending practices aligned with one belief set, but not actually addressing those beliefs or alternative 
sets of beliefs – is likely to have the desired impact on Risk Culture.
15 / All on the Same Train, Ingram, Thompson, Underwood (2014) iRisk and A Study of Insurer Risk Strategies, Ingram, Thayer, Underwood (2013) ICA 2014 
https://cas.confex.com/cas/ica14/webprogram/Session5862.html
16 / See Clumsy Solutions for a Complex World (M. Verweij and M. Thompson (eds) 2011, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan)
Category Risk Beliefs Preferred Strategy
Maximizer
The world tends to stable 
equilibrium, so risk is 
temporary and unimportant
Risk Trading: accept well-priced risks (even 
very large ones) in order to maximize profits
Manager
Risk is predictable within 
certain limits but dangerous 
beyond that
Risk Steering: carefully balance risk and 
reward within certain constraints, using 
technical expertise 
Conservator
The world is dangerous and 
equilibrium is precarious
Loss Controlling: minimize risk, even at the 
expense of profit, to avoid devastating results
Pragmatist
The world is inherently 
unpredictable and risk 
cannot be well understood
Diversification: keep options open; seek 
freedom to react to changing conditions
what is risk?
Since the dawn of scientific risk management, there has been a widespread belief that there is a determinable, 
objective value for risk (the fifth underlying belief of ERM above).  Risk is a measure of the variability of future 
events.  Just as we can know where a ball will be three seconds after we drop it, we can know the risk of 
owning a financial instrument. Risk can, should, and must be measured so that it can be managed.
But NCE adherents are concerned with exploiting risk, not measuring it. And for more than 40 years 
anthropologists studying plural rationality have asserted that risk is actually subjective: socially constructed, 
this way or that, so as to support the various social solidarities.
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Though initially in the objectivist camp, both Britain’s Royal Society and the U.S.’s National Academy of 
Science now recognize that scientific expertise feeds into a political process. They therefore concede that 
“public perceptions should be included in the assessment of risk”. As the eminent British scientist Derek 
Burke said, scientists’ failure to appreciate the essentially political context of their work led to their being seen 
as “arrogant, distant and uncaring”. And if this holds for risk in general then it should also hold for financial 
risks. Their assessment is never just a technical and mathematical matter.17
implications for risk culture
Fundamentally, the ten Risk Culture recommendations seek to impose practices that are highly consistent 
with pure ERM beliefs on all financial institutions, regardless of the firms’ actual underlying beliefs.
Culture develops as an organization successfully navigates its formational challenges. A firm’s culture is a 
combination of the values, beliefs, and practices that led the organization to success. Typically there are many 
factors – and so the firm’s culture is unlikely to be monolithic. Similarly, the risk lessons learned by different 
groups within the firm are likely to vary, leading to varying perspectives on risk.
Without considering the differing perspectives of the various stakeholders in financial transactions, 
prescriptions for financial risk management and Risk Culture face an uphill battle for meaningful adoption. No 
matter how strong the expert consensus regarding the probabilities and associated impacts of possible future 
outcomes, risk entails human and political dimensions that technocrats neglect at the peril of finding their 
recommendations rejected, ignored, or given mere lip service. Therefore we believe a truly useful description 
of healthy Risk Culture must respect not only the heterogeneous nature of culture but also plural perspectives 
on risk.
Such a multifaceted framework for Risk Culture is quite achievable – and indeed likely to yield more robust 
results than any monoculture. As we have set out in other writings18, hybrid Risk Cultures draw from the 
strengths of various perspectives to yield a result that is more meaningful and better accepted, because it 
aligns with underlying belief sets – but also more resilient in an ever-changing world.
A resilient hybrid culture cannot be achieved by simply importing a pure ERM subculture into an NCE 
monoculture. It is achieved by developing a blended belief system that incorporates elements of the ERM 
beliefs into the organization’s dominant culture. These beliefs will then support the adoption of some version 
(though not necessarily the version espoused by the regulators) of the ten Risk Culture practices. 
17 / See M. Thompson and S. Rayner (1998) Risk and Governance Part 1, “Government and Opposition”
18 / “The Fabric of ERM,” Ingram, Underwood, The Actuary, (2011)
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Protection against extreme losses on the financial 
markets by means of tactical “low eVaR allocation”!
by Dr. Frank Schmielewski
Development of “smart beta,” and in the 
recent past “smart factor,” strategies has 
been expanding dramatically since the global 
financial crisis of 2007/2008. Critics bemoan 
that successful operations depend on prevailing 
market conditions. Smart beta strategies seek 
to reduce the beta in a portfolio during phases 
of market turbulence, without neglecting market 
return during phases of upturn. An objective 
review of smart beta strategies becomes very 
important in relation to tactical allocation of 
stocks, which, in the same way, adjusts itself, 
with the most precise possible timing to reduce 
exposure to risks during times of tension in 
the markets and increase it during booms, 
something that in most situations is difficult to 
achieve in practice.
Smart beta strategies rely on various methods. 
They are often based on differing quantifying 
elements of the capital weighted index, in the 
simplest case of the equal weighting of each 
investment (i.e., equally weighting) or in the 
risk-orientated case of weighting alongside risk 
attribution of each investment (i.e., risk parity). 
Another type of smart beta strategy relies, with 
selection of less-risky investments, on capital 
market anomalies, described by Haugen and 
Heins (1972) in the 1970s as low volatility or 
the minimization of portfolio variance based on 
diversification within the context of classical 
Markowitz optimisation (i.e., minimum variance). 
Recent studies describe strategies that target 
risk exposure of stock portfolios aligned with 
market volatility to avoid greater losses during 
periods of high volatility (i.e., volatility control). 
The precondition for this being that it is possible 
to forecast the volatility of a market and identify 
appropriate market timing.
Although comprehensive classification of 
the various strategies might appear difficult, 
practical findings are often sobering. The 
majority of strategies lead to strongly diverging 
results in differing market phases regarding risks 
and return; the problem of tactical allocation 
shifts to selection of an appropriate strategy for 
a given market phase.
All experiences with smart beta and available 
results suggest that it is conceptually sensible 
to combine smart beta strategies with tactical 
allocation of assets to generate value-added, 
efficient, affordable protection against extreme 
losses (i.e., downside protection) within 
the context of general risk reduction and 
simultaneous participation during positive 
market phases. Effective downside protection 
presupposes above all that an adequate risk 
measure be applied that has a low margin of 
error and focuses largely on tail risk modelling 
such as extreme value-at-risk (eVaR) from the 
RC Banken Group.
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These reviews serve not merely the information 
content of eVaR as a robust risk measure; they 
should also be understood much more as further 
development of what is established in practice 
(Schmielewski 2013).
eVaR is based on methods of natural catastrophe 
research during assessment of storm floods, 
torrential rainfall, or the extent of earthquakes. 
Quantitative procedures developed in this area 
of research—the extreme value statistic, often 
called the extreme-value theory—concentrate 
on modelling rare occurrences that have had 
dramatic repercussions (Embrechts et al. 1997, 
Schmielewski 2011).
These proven methods of natural catastrophe 
research should be applied to the finance market 
to assess tail risks, with the least error tolerance 
(Bensalah 2000, Schmielewski 2013). For this 
purpose, the RC Banken Group developed 
a process that adapts general extreme value 
distributions to daily practice of risk and portfolio 
management, and with eVaR monitors the 
entire global stock universe and other financial 
instruments with the highest degree of assessment 
accuracy of potential extreme risks (Schmielewski 
2013).
Combined with very robust assessments, 
eVaR provides early indication of developing 
extreme risks for asset types, regions, and 
sectors, including timely global monitoring for 
all conceivable sub-markets at the individual 
stock level so that appropriate measures of risk 
prevention can be taken. As a result, eVaR is 
suitable for inclusion during investment selection 
and portfolio creation. In the most straightforward 
case, the portfolio manager invests evenly and 
exclusively in enterprises for which a lower eVaR is 
assessed (i.e., simple low eVaR strategy). A more 
complex approach considers additional sector or 
regional constraints and the market liquidity of the 
individual investment, or ranks them in terms of 
risk according to eVaR assessments. Simulation 
results in Table 1 suggest that a low eVaR 
strategy, with its return/risk profile, dominates 
the benchmark significantly, and strategies 
expanded based on sector constraints or risk 
parities deliver less than optimum values. This can 
be explained by additional secondary conditions 
that push stock selection to higher eVaR values. 
What is convincing however is that in all strategies 
depicted, extreme risk, measured based on 
maximum drawdowns of the Pain Index or Ulcer 
Index, reduces dramatically without the investor 
having to sacrifice return. In the real world, this is 
underpinned by the Modulator Low eVaR Index 
(Bloomberg/Reuters: MODEVAR).
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Return & Risk Analysis Simple low eVaR 100*
Low eVaR 100 
Risk Parity*
Low eVaR 100 
diversified*
Global Stock 
Market
Annualised Return (%) 13.04 13.16 12.66 5.21
Volatility (%) 8.19 8.28 8.82 15.25
Sharp Ratio 1.59 1.59 1.44 0.34
Downside Variance (%) 5.69 5.69 6.17 10.91
Maximum Drawdown (%) 26.44 26.72 32.24 59.10
Pain Index (%)** 2.91 2.90 3.39 15.73
Ulcer Index (%)** 18.52 20.33 24.98 75.20
Return/Ulcer Index 0.70 0.65 0.51 0.07
*portfolio simulation, made up of 100 stocks each with low eVaR quarterly values for the period from 1993 
through 2014, quarterly rebalancing and transaction cost of 50 bp:  
- simple low eVaR 100: Selection without secondary conditions and weighting equally;
- low eVaR risk parity: Selection without secondary conditions and risk-parity weighting;
- low eVaR 100 diversified: Max 20% pro sector, average volume traded >1,000,000 USD and weighting 
equally. 
**The Pain Index is established as a means of observing drawdowns during the monitoring time frame, the 
Ulcer Index as a means of squaring the drawdowns.
Low-volatility strategies, which in previous years the financial industry preferred, must justifiably endure an 
increasing degree of scepticism since such methods and related ones deliver desired results only during 
some market phases. It is for this reason that when simulating innovative investment strategies, this criticism 
is viewed through analysis based on differentiating market phases. As an example (Table 2), a low-eVaR 
strategy clearly makes possible not only painless survival during crises, but also achievement of significant 
returns, as in cases of the bursting of the technology bubble from 1999 to 2001, or during the 2011 credit 
crisis in the euro zone. Through a simple eVaR strategy, which because of the chosen methodologies 
can be regarded as an intuitive and indeed expected result, it has even been possible to survive the 
global financial crisis (2007 to 2009), including its to-date unnoticed effects on the financial markets, with 
a marginal loss of 0.56%.
table #1: Comparison of differing low eVaR strategies
024 Intelligent Risk - December, 2014 
Time 
Periods
Global Stock 
Markets
Low eVaR 100 
strategy
Technology Bubble Bursts 1999-2000 -52.94% 51.10%
Global Financial Crisis 2007-2009 -15.10% -0.56%
Credit Crisis in Eurozone 2011 -7.62% 7.86%
Periods Free of Crisis 1997-2013 183.61% 184.49%
Complete Time Period 1997-2013 107.95% 242.89%
*Portfolio simulation, comprised of 100 stocks each, with low eVaR quarterly values for the period 1993 
through 2014, quarterly rebalancing and transaction cost of 50 bp.  
The central question for the sceptic of risk-based strategies is not only how expensive is downside 
protection during positive market phases because of missed opportunities. The accumulated return during 
crises, singularly portrayed in Table 2, makes clear that the price of a low-eVaR strategy is negligible since 
the return achieved accords with market return. In contrast to smart beta strategies, low-eVaR strategies 
reduce drawdowns, but during periods of positive market mood, they exhaust the market potential fully. 
A question must be posed regarding whether it makes sense during high market-price risk to reduce 
the investment ratio in risky asset sectors that immediately lead to risk budgeting or tactical allocation 
(Stoyanov 2011, Guilleminot et al. 2014).
Benson et al. (2014) point to a domino effect in financial markets, which should be considered when 
arranging risk budgeting or tactical allocation. Investors observe increasing volatility and begin selling shares 
in line with their risk aversion, which in turn adds to market volatility and triggers further selling so a self-
accelerating, vicious circle occurs. This investor behaviour explains why by means of systemic monitoring 
of the global stock universe at the individual stock level, rising eVaR values are observed during an early 
stage, before dramatic market turbulences occur (Illustration 1).
table #2: Cumulative return from a low evar strategy during differing market phases
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illustration #1: 
Percentage of stocks with slight eVaR evaluations as efficient crisis indicator
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This insight can be applied as a result of fixing risk budgets within the framework of tactical-asset allocation. 
In Table 3, the following simplified example of a randomly chosen risk budget of 7% is depicted.
Investment eVaR January 2007
Risk Budget/
eVaR January 
2007 (Allocation)
eVaR 
January 
2008
Risk Budget/
eVaR January 2008 
(Allocation)
Stock A 3.50% 2.00% 7.00% 1.00%
Stock B 7.00% 1.00% 14.00% 0.50%
Stock C 14.00% 0.50% 21.00% 0.33%
Total 3.50% 1.83%
table #1: Simplified example of eVaR risk budget based allocation of stocks
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illustration #2: 
Calculation of risk exposure by means of eVaR risk budgets
Due to the increase in eVaR evaluations from the beginning of 2007 to the beginning of 2008, the total 
allocation of these three entities reduces from 3.50% to 1.83% as downside protection. An eVaR-based 
allocation, according with the formula in illustration 2, can be used to calculate a balanced portfolio of 
stocks and bonds.
With the help of eVaR risk budgeting, allocation of invested capital in the stocks and bonds markets, or 
appropriate adaption of balancing other assets, can now be determined according to the individual utility 
functions of the investors. This is only admissible when risk budgeting in comparison to other risk measures 
meets highly robust eVaR evaluations. In this context, a question arises regarding how soon the allocation 
adjustment can be made during a crisis—is the eVaR time-invariant and does it react quickly enough to a 
tactical manoeuvre to be deployed effectively?
The observation of differing risk budgets in Illustration 3 provides additional insights. Simulations imply 
allocation of resources in the global stock markets and the JPM Global Aggregate Bond Index in accordance 
with the methodologies above, whereby time-specific allocation of invested capital in the stock markets 
is invested—equally weighted—in the stocks with the lowest eVaR estimates. Illustration 3 shows that 
increased risk budget links as expected with an increased return when extreme risks increase, measured 
here using the Ulcer Index.
with period t=(1,2,…,p), risk budget r, extreme value-at-risk eVaR, eVaR quantile q, maximum number of 
selected entities n,  maximum allocation of stocks eq, and maximum allocation in the bond markets b.
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illustration #3: 
Influence of eVaR risk budget on return and risk
This correlation demonstrates that eVaR is suitable for very efficient risk-reductions by using risk budgeting. 
To answer the question, eVaR provides minimum disturbance and clear signals, shows itself in simulation 
to be extremely robust, and reacts with adequate sensitivity regarding tactical manoeuvres so it can be 
deployed as a practical and tactical resource.
From a practical viewpoint, it is above all essential for the portfolio manager to determine risk budgeting to 
the optimum. Observation of the relationship between return and Ulcer Index provides guidance. The rising 
return curve in illustration 3 corresponds to a comparatively steeply rising curve in the Ulcer Index so the 
relationship between return and Ulcer Index becomes more unfavourable with increasing risk budget. This 
correlation allows us to adjust the risk budget concerning return expectations and risk adversity alongside 
individual utility functions. The portfolio manager can choose, for example, a defensive, neutral, or offensive 
strategy, as Table 4 demonstrates, and decide on an insurance sum for downside protection. When 
making such strategic decisions, which are compatible with the risk exposure of an investor, it is advisable 
that cumulative performance converge with the increasing risk budget based on a simple, low-eVaR 100 
strategy (Illustration 4).
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Costs and uses of a “downside protection” by means of eVaR risk budgeting
table #4:
Investment
Simple 
low eVaR 
100*
Dynamic low 
eVaR 100 
defensive*
Dynamic low 
eVaR 100 
neutral*
Dynamic low 
eVaR 100 
offensive*
Global 
Stock 
Market
Annualised 
Return (%)
13.04 10.60 11.41 12.15 5.21
Volatility (%) 8.09 5.77 6.51 7.10 15.25
Sharp Ratio 1.59 1.84 1.75 1.71 0.34
Downside 
Variance (%)
5.69 3.95 4.43 4.90 10.91
Maximum 
Drawdown (%)
26.44 18.12 20.64 22.56 59.10
Pain Index (%) ** 2.91 2.00 2.49 2.81 15.73
Ulcer Index (%) 
**
18.52 10.51 12.32 14.61 75.20
Return/Ulcer 
Index
0.70 1.01 0.93 0.83 0.07
Average Stock 
Allocation
100 65.96 76.77 86.66 92.01
* Portfolio simulation comprised of 100 stocks, each with low eVaR, quarterly values for the period 1993 
through 2014, quarterly rebalancing and transaction cost of 50 bp:  
-simple low eVaR 100: Selection without secondary conditions and equally weighting;
-dynamic low eVaR 100 stock/bond market allocation through risk budget (defensive 7%, neutral 8%, 
offensive 9%), selection without sub-conditions and weighting equally.
**The Pain Index is established as a means of observing drawdowns during the monitoring time frame, the 
ulcer index as a means of squaring the drawdowns.
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illustration #4: 
Convergence of differing “dynamic eVaR” strategies based on a “simple low 
eVaR” strategy
* Portfolio simulation comprised of 100 stocks, each with low eVaR quarterly values for the period 1993 
through 2014, quarterly rebalancing and transaction cost of 50 bp: 
summary and conclusion
The eVaR strategy can be applied as a robust risk measure in a protection plan, and does not link to usual 
costs that result from failing to exhaust market potential during recovery or upturn phases of the stock 
market. The methodologies introduced here bridge smart beta strategies and dynamic, tactical allocations. 
Results demonstrate that a portfolio manager can arrange favoured downside protection by determining the 
eVaR risk budget that accords with return expectations and risk aversions, without fearing rare occurrences 
of having protected at too high a price.
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Part II
The possibility that we are coming full circle
by Hilary Till
the history of financial derivatives, a 2-part feature
An essential, conceptual development that enabled financial derivatives to flourish was creation of 
business models for those involved in financial derivatives. 
Asset managers must choose which risks they have an edge on; they need to decide how to 
size and combine chosen risks, and finally decide which risks to hedge at either the factor or 
macro levels.
The Business Models
This 2-part series discusses the emergence of financial derivatives after the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods accord in 1971. In Part 1, the article explains the concepts that enabled financial derivatives 
markets to flourish, focusing on the required mathematical concepts. Part 2 continues with enumerating 
the business models that have been employed by successful commercial participants in the financial 
derivatives arena. Part 2 also briefly covers the development of over-the-counter financial derivatives, 
including their misuse during the lead-up to the Global Financial Crisis. The article concludes with the 
possibility that we may be nearing the limits of what the power of mathematics can do to hedge, and 
thereby conquer, financial risk. 
abstract
concepts that enabled financial derivatives markets to flourish
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1. Successful asset managers must be experts in portfolio theory
For derivatives markets to work, there needs to be demand from investors or commercials to 
lay off a first-order risk (such as interest-rate or foreign-exchange risk.) These participants do not 
mind doing so as long as the cost is small in comparison to overall profits of their investments or 
business enterprises. With volatile risks hedged, a commercial entity can focus on its chosen area 
of expertise and engage in long-term planning, despite uncertainties in financial markets. 
Typically, a price-risk specialist (or speculator) will take on this first-order risk, hedging the exposure 
with a related derivative or security and creating smaller exposure or basis risk in which they are 
experts at managing. The price-risk specialist will often be a part of a specialized firm, set up to 
efficiently and cost-effectively manage basis risk. A basis relationship is more stable and predictable 
than various outright risks (e.g., the direction of a currency pair or long-term interest rates.) As long 
as various basis relationships are stable and predictable, entire institutions can be created around 
an expertise under the assumption and management of various basis risks. Goldman Sachs and 
Chicago proprietary trading firms are examples.
In a post-Bretton Woods financial world of floating currencies and interest rates, businesses flourished 
despite all the uncertainties in financial variables because they hedge risks cost-effectively through 
basis-risk specialists. A basis-risk specialist might choose to lay off some further specialized risk 
to another price-risk specialist, who in turn might do the same, which then creates an entire food-
chain of interconnected, highly-specialized financial intermediaries. Derivatives markets have made 
possible the specialization of risk-taking rather than the elimination of risk.
A key aspect of basis-risk handling is that the activity cannot be very profitable. Otherwise, no 
commercial would pay for the service of having risk hedged. Profitable management of basis risk 
relies on the ability to handle risks in a leveraged fashion. There exists constant pressure to find 
ways to minimize capital used to undertake this business. If the business becomes too capital 
intensive, it is not viable.
Another important aspect of basis-risk handling is that even when a price relationship is highly 
significant, there will always be anomalous events. The long-term capital management (LTCM) 
implosion in 1998 is a good example. What leverage level is chosen and how one conducts risk 
management determines whether a business has a long-term future. In LTCM’s case, it was 
inadvisable to assume that a theoretical boundary condition would hold—that a sovereign would 
not default on debt issued in its own currency. Russia did precisely this in 1998. Analogously, 
in AIG’s case, it was inadvisable to assume that U.S. housing prices would not plummet, but it 
occurred in 2007.
2. All viable financial intermediaries manage basis risk
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the emergence of Over-The-Counter (OTC) derivatives
Explained by Moore and Khoja (2008), “OTC derivatives emerged because they provided companies 
who were hedging risks the ability to enter customized contracts that matched their unique risk profiles.” 
Historically, companies could “hedge without posting daily margins [on] exchange[s].” The latter rationale is 
the reason for increased popularity of OTC derivatives.
Rationale
With the possibility of swaps not being margined over long timeframes, new metrics were developed for 
accumulating credit risk associated with having an in-the-money swap.
Credit risk and appropriate measures
After a number of high-profile institutional blow-ups due to inappropriate use of OTC derivatives in 1994, 
institutional investors had to develop new disciplined, internal processes. Figure 1 demonstrates one such 
process.
Disciplined internal processes for institutional investors
Surprisingly, OTC derivatives markets flourished from 1981 onward even though there was regulatory and 
legal uncertainty in these markets until 2000. “Congress embraced wholesale legalization of OTC derivatives 
in 2000 with the Commodities Futures Modernization Act,” writes Stout (2009).
Regulatory forbearance
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The global financial crisis and its aftermath are causing large changes in the derivatives marketplace. 
“Credit-default swaps (CDS) are insurance-like derivatives, or side bets, that protect investors from 
bad events like a company going bankrupt or a country failing to pay its debts,” writes Eisinger 
(2012).
The global financial crisis and its aftermath
Source: Till (2014), slide 41
Figure 1 demonstrates one such disciplined internal process.
1. Questionable incentives and leverage
ADJUSTMENTS 
ACCORDING TO 
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VERIFICATION
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Execution
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Risk Management committee,
chaired by the Risk Management Group
Derivatives Overlay Manager
Trading Team
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Oversight by Investment Leader (or 
Back-up)
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Compliance
Sign-off by Portfolio Managers
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illustration #1: 
Disciplined internal process for an institutional investor
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They are equivalent to puts. In viewing the events of 2008, there have been questions about the 
ability to enter CDS on corporate names when an investor has no economic exposure to that 
name. Some compare it to buying fire insurance on a neighbor’s home.
Prior to 2008, Ritholtz (2012) recounts, “The biggest underwriter of [OTC credit] default swaps was 
AIG, the world’s largest insurer. Without [a] reserve-requirement limitation, it was free to underwrite 
as many swaps as it could print. And that was just what it did: AIG’s Financial Products unit 
underwrote more than $3 trillion worth of derivatives, with precisely zero dollars reserved for paying 
any potential claim.” Later, the firm became the recipient of a “$185 billion government bailout.” 
The global swaps market is changing dramatically due to the Dodd-Frank Act. Summarizing, 
Moeller and Walsky (2012) report, “The act mandates increased transparency and requires firms 
to execute potentially 90 per cent of swaps electronically, either on a designated contract market 
or a Swap Execution Facility, a new type of trading venue. Trades will then clear through a central 
counterparty.” This requirement shifts systemic risk to clearinghouses. Ultimately, the trend is for 
swaps to be “transformed into futures contracts as Dodd-Frank Act regulations impose higher 
margins and capital for swap users compared with futures,” writes Leising (2012).
There is a debate on the financialization of the commodities market, leading to even more leveraged 
commodity markets. One could argue that a larger current trend is the backing of derivatives by not only 
additional collateral, but also real assets, leading to deleveraged financial markets.
“In October 2009, the CME Group said it would allow physical gold to be used as collateral for margin 
requirements [in London], a move that was followed by its rival, the IntercontinentalExchange, in late 2010” 
at ICE Clear Europe, reports Freeman (2011), who also notes, “In February [2011], JP Morgan Chase & Co. 
announced its decision to accept physical gold as collateral in some financial transactions.” MacDonald 
(2012) argues, “LCH.Clearnet Group Ltd. has been using gold as collateral since 2011.” In August 2012, 
CME Clearing Europe “announced it had extended the range of eligible collateral types to include gold 
bullion,” the CME Group (2012) reports.
By allowing gold as collateral, investors—at least in Europe—can hold assets in the precious metal, but 
are still exposed to the potential upside of financial markets through derivatives. In a way, they are starting 
to recreate a private form of the Bretton Woods accord—they have financial instruments that are at least 
partly backed by gold.
2. Re-engineering the OTC marketplace
possibility that we are coming full circle
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Separately in 2011, the launch of several exchange-traded funds, backed by a variety of physical metals in 
addition to gold, provided commodities investors with new investment options. It appeared at the time that 
retail investors were also starting to recreate the Bretton Woods accord by holding metal-backed financial 
instruments.
The Governor of the People’s Bank of China wrote in Xiaochuan (2009) that he regretted that Keynes’ 
Bancor proposal had not been accepted. With the Bancor, all currencies would have been pegged to a 
basket of commodities, providing a stable benchmark. The Bank of China governor stated, “The acceptance 
of credit-based national currencies as major international reserve currencies, as is the case in the current 
system, is a rare special case in history.” He also noted, “Re-establishment of a new and widely accepted 
reserve currency with a stable valuation benchmark may take a long time.”
For now, we can expect consensus that financial derivatives will continue to be valid tools for managing 
volatile financial risk.
This two-part series is excerpted from a presentation given by the author on February 10, 2014 at a joint 
meeting in Chicago of two organizations: the Professional Risk Managers’ International Association (PRMIA) 
and the Chartered Alternative Investment Analyst (CAIA) Association. The presentation was excerpted from 
a full-day seminar given by the author to representatives of the China Foreign Exchange Trade System, a 
sub-institution of the People’s Bank of China, in December 2012.
The views expressed in this article are the opinions of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views 
of organizations with which she affiliates. 
endnotes
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by Workiva
the top 10 ORSA pitfalls
The inaugural year of the ORSA process and its accompanying Summary Report present significant 
challenges and opportunities for insurance companies. Although based on an organization’s existing 
ERM framework, ORSA is a new regulatory requirement that demands a substantial investment of 
resources and time. The challenge presented by the ORSA requirement is to develop a process and 
produce a Summary Report that closely matches the unique goals, policies, and practices of the insurer, 
while avoiding a cookie-cutter approach. 
Below are the top ten pitfalls that could derail your ORSA process:
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An assessment that is the right size doesn’t overwhelm the reader, nor does it contain unnecessary 
complexity. Gear the report to an executive readership—senior management, board of directors, 
state commissioners, and perhaps, rating agencies. This level of readership appreciates concise 
messages as opposed to having their minds numbed by hundreds of pages of extraneous details.
1. Do not make the ORSA Summary Report overly complex.
While producing an overly complex Summary Report can be problematic, going too far in the opposite 
direction can create similar issues. Some ORSA participants might be greatly tempted to obscure 
problems for which they are responsible. Obviously, the organization’s ethos and the makeup of the 
ORSA team play a pivotal role in how open and candid the Summary Report becomes.
2. Avoid being too broad or too vague in the ORSA Summary Report.
Stakeholders in the ORSA process is a heady group—NAIC, IAIS, your state’s regulators, ratings 
agencies, and your board of directors. All of these entities are exerting pressure on you to get it 
right. For some, the impulse may be to use a prescribed or “check-the-box” process that slavishly 
adheres to the letter, if not spirit, of your state’s ORSA regulations. Resist this temptation. It will 
reduce the value of the ORSA process as a management tool and turn it into a compliance exercise.
3. Avoid a prescriptive approach.
The competition for resources within your organization might create a tendency to push off the ORSA 
process until close to the due date. Yet, what higher priority can there be than to ensure the stability of 
your business in an ever-riskier world? A last-minute effort will undoubtedly produce suboptimal results.
4. Do not wait until the last minute to start the ORSA process or put together the  
    Summary Report.
ORSA and ERM share a common purpose—to illuminate how a company identifies, measures, and 
manages risk and the process it follows to determine the appropriate amount of capital for those risks. 
Thus, the ORSA Summary Report is merely a new process for sharing vital information in line with 
processes that have likely evolved over the life span of any organization. Any attempt to make ORSA a 
separate process only acts to devalue it.
5. Do not make ORSA a separate process.
Companies would no sooner want to manually enact the ORSA process and produce the Summary 
Report than perform capital budgeting with only a pencil and paper. However, the Summary Report 
often relies on many other reports, databases, and processes throughout the company, making it 
a time-consuming effort to pull together all necessary information. Even more worrisome—manual 
methods invite opportunities for inconsistencies and errors.
6. Avoid manual and time-consuming reporting processes.
The statutory approach for defining risk-based capital (RBC) requirements is not designed for determining 
the correct amount of capital to actually hold. The current factor based RBC approach cannot keep up 
with product innovation and will not appropriately capture all of the risks that an insurance company faces. 
Statutory RBC serves as an early warning signal for regulators and is not meant to be an appropriate 
measure of capital adequacy—it simply guarantees and authorizes regulatory action.
7. Look beyond the statutes to figure capital requirements.
Just as the ORSA is an outgrowth of a company’s ERM, deficiencies in the ORSA Summary Report—or, 
at least, in its first draft—is a warning that something in your ERM needs to be improved. Only through 
systematic collaboration will the resulting ORSA Summary Report provide maximum benefit to the 
organization and its stakeholders.
8. Do not produce the ORSA Summary report in a vacuum.
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Beyond the risk of insufficient capital during times of stress, an organization must consider other forms 
of risk, including reputational, liquidity, and operational. In complex situations, different risks may create 
a negative synergy that generates dangers exceeding the sum of the individual risks. Perhaps the 
biggest risk is an ORSA process and Summary Report that fails to consider interactions among risks 
and their related potential damage to the organization.
Past is not necessarily prelude, especially in the insurance industry. New risks continually arise, and old 
ones morph in nature, size, and impact. The ORSA process and Summary Report are meant to have 
a prospective view. In risk reporting, various metrics are often based on historical results. While much 
can learned by studying the past, much more can be gained by understanding the present and making 
educated predictions about the future.
9. Do not take a siloed approach to the ORSA process.
10. Do not simply report on past results.
The ORSA Summary Report process is now an integral part of the 2015 cycle, and it will become increasingly 
relevant in subsequent years. Developing a sound plan for dealing with the requirement is good strategy, 
good planning, and just good business. To see a full explanation of these ten pitfalls and strategies for 
avoiding them, access the full white paper.
Workiva created Wdesk, a cloud-based platform for enterprises to collect, manage, report, and analyze 
business data in real time. Wdesk includes a sophisticated productivity suite for business data collaboration 
and reporting that is used by thousands of corporations, including more than 60 percent of the Fortune 
500. Wdesk proprietary word processing, spreadsheet, and presentation applications are fully integrated 
and built upon the Workiva data management engine. Wdesk helps reduce enterprise risk and increase 
productivity with synchronized data, controlled collaboration, granular permissions, and a full audit trail. This 
gives users confidence to make decisions with real-time data. Workiva employs more than 900 people with 
offices in 15 cities. The company is headquartered in Ames, Iowa. For more information, visit workiva.com.
You can download the full white paper here.
conclusion
company overview
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by Christoffer Willer
Solvency II: Assessment of the interest rate risk sub-module
The regulatory framework in Europe is evolving as the Solvency II implementation date approaches. 
One of the most recent developments is the publication “The underlying assumptions in the standard 
formula for the Solvency Capital Requirement calculation” (“SCR Assumptions”) from EIOPA, which as 
the title suggests, presents assumptions on which the SCR calculation is built. It offers a clear starting 
point for evaluation of the appropriateness of future capital requirements, a mandate of the ORSA/
FLAOR process:
The phrase “overall solvency needs” consists of both quantitative and qualitative tests and requirements; 
the quote expresses one such requirement. This article relates to the Solvency Capital Requirement 
calculation (SCR calculation) during the ORSA/FLAOR process, and based on the interest rate risk 
module. The central document for this task is the article SCR assumptions.  
Interest rate risk is calculated by shifting the entire yield curve upward and downward, where the 
disparity in valuation between the original and stressed yield curves is an expression of risk. Figure 
1 shows an initial yield curve (i.e., the middle curve) with two stressed yield curves (illustrated by the 
arrows). 
interest rate risk sub-module
interest rate
maturity (years)
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Where the undertaking uses the standard formula as a baseline for its assessment 
of its overall solvency needs, it is expected to demonstrate that this is appropriate 
to the risks inherent in its business and reflects its risk profile.“ (3.39, page 14)     
‘‘
The interest rate to each maturity on the yield curve is stressed with a relative factor, where the size of the 
stress factors depends on the length of maturity. Short maturities have larger stresses than long maturities, 
which indicate higher volatility for short interest rates. This approach, combined with assumptions from this 
sub-module, sets boundaries for calculation of interest rate risk. EIOPA highlights the following assumptions: 
The interest rate for a 15-year maturity rises 33% upward and 27% downward. Stress of 33/-27 causes 
greater absolute stress when the 15-year interest rate is 5% instead of 2.5%. This reasoning applies to all 
maturities on the yield curve. 
When performing FLAOR, the first question is whether the methodology and assumptions suit the business 
risk. Since interest rate risk is calculated from one scenario, in which each maturity is expressed as a fixed 
percentage, it is not calculated as either steepening or flattening of the yield curve, or any other scenario 
one can create that might prove more severe to some businesses. With FLAOR, such scenarios could be 
compared with the SCR methodology.
EIOPA describes another assumption during explanation of the interest rate sub-module: 
This assumption is confirmed in Figure 2, which shows relative stresses for a 15-year maturity.
• Only interest rate risk that arises from changes in the level of basic, risk-free interest rates is 
captured;
•  Volatility and changes to the shape of the yield curve are not covered explicitly in the interest risk 
sub-module;
•  The undertaking is not exposed to material inflation or deflation risk.
•  During times of lower interest rates, absolute shocks are lower, and vice versa. 
illustration #2: 
Stress 33% -27%
Relative Stress “up”      Relative Stress “down”
Stress to the 15-year maturity
1 / SCR assumptions, section 2.1, page 14
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Details in the interest rate risk sub-module to note when performing the FLAOR
When studying the methodology in the delegated act from EIOPA, other assumptions are submitted when 
constructing the new yield curves.2
A natural question during FLAOR relates directly to the second bullet: When an interest rate is negative, is 
it unlikely to lessen? The first bullet also provides content regarding FLAOR, as what follows demonstrates. 
Figure 3 shows where the minimum one-percentage-point change in the upward scenario becomes relevant 
for maturities up to 20 years.
2 / Delegated act page 150-151
•  “The increase of basic risk-free interest rates at any maturity shall be at least one percentage 
point;” 
•  “For negative basic risk-free interest rates, the decrease shall be nil.”
illustration #3: Minimum shocked upward yield curve
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illustration #4: Relative stress factor for the 15-year maturity
Figure 3 shows that maturities up to 2 years should be at least 1.43% for the relative stress factor to be 
relevant, and for the 15-year maturity to equal 3%. For interest rates below 3%, a one-percentage-point 
absolute stress is applied, and above 3%, the relative stress factor of 33 % applies. Hence, absolute shock 
does not always become absolutely smaller with the interest rate. Figure 4 shows that the relative stress 
factor for a 15-year maturity evolves with the interest rate during an upward scenario.
The relative stress factor is extremely high when interest rates are low, and it converges to a relative stress 
factor of 33% as the rate moves toward 3%, where it remains 33% while the absolute stress increases. 
Figure 5 shows that the absolute stress factor evolves with the size of the interest rate.
Interest rateRelative stress
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The figure shows that from 0% to 3%, absolute stress is one percentage point, and for rates higher than 
3%, absolute stress is 33% of the rate. Figure 5 shows that the relative shock increases when the interest 
rate for a 15-year maturity is below 3%. Figure 6 shows that absolute stress for a 15-year maturity does not 
decrease as the interest rate decreases. The picture is the same for all maturities even though the examples 
are based on a 15-year maturity. FLAOR is a tool to consider whether this feature represents exposure to 
interest rates. 
Another issue to consider when assessing the interest rate risk sub-module concerns calibration data from 
which stresses are derived. Data are EUR and GBP Gov rates from 1999 through 2010, combined with 
EUR and GBP LIBOR rates from the same period. At least two observations arise: 
illustration #5: Absolute stress factor for the 15-year maturity
1. Are time series of 11 years sufficient? 
2. Are EUR and GBP LIBOR rates representative for the risk in every yield curve?
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This article examines the interest rate risk sub-module to illustrate topics related to FLAOR. It suggests 
value in examining the capital requirement in the future Solvency II scheme. 
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by Kevin M. Cuff, PRMIA Executive Director
PRMIA Members Survey, 2014
During September and October, 2014 we completed our fifth PRMIA membership survey. In total, we 
received 440 responses which, arguably, represents the industry survey response standard of 8% - 
10% of our 5,000 voting Regular Members.  The feedback is generally very positive with some helpful 
ideas contained in the detailed comments we received.
The response total (440) is lower than in previous years, which raises a question as to the engagement 
of PRMIA’s members.  It is also worth noting that we have had an unusually high number of surveys 
sent to members in recent months, so ‘survey fatigue’ could be at play.
This data should serve to supplement Board discussions and should aid the annual Strategic Planning 
process.  A summary of all comments for each question is also included in this document.  A more 
detailed version of the survey results and comment data is also available.
Overall, the survey provides accurate feedback for the core engaged constituency of PRMIA.  It fails to 
measure accurate feedback from the shadow or disenfranchised member which is, ultimately, the best 
feedback to receive.
Read the full survey here.
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by Elizabeth Sheedy & Barbara Griffin
what we know about risk culture in financial institutions: 
some preliminary findings
We define risk culture as the shared perceptions among employees of the relative priority given to 
risk management, including perceptions of the practices and behaviours that are expected, valued 
and supported.   Risk culture is only one aspect of broader organisational culture; other aspects that 
have been investigated across industries include Innovation Culture, Customer Service Culture and 
Safety Culture.  However, in the context of FIs, especially those considered ‘too big to fail’, the relative 
priority given to risk management is relevant to a range of stakeholders and is of particular interest to 
prudential supervisors.  
Risk culture is distinct from risk appetite.  A strong risk culture doesn’t necessarily mean that risk is 
always minimised and that the appetite for risk is low.  A strong risk culture implies, however, that staff 
throughout the organisation have a clear understanding of the boundaries of acceptable risk taking 
and are committed to ensuring that those boundaries are respected.  As a result we hypothesise that 
robust risk culture helps organisations avoid unexpected shocks and gaming behaviour, but does not 
necessarily prevent losses from occurring.  Risk appetite is a separate consideration to be determined 
by the stakeholders of the FI.
An exciting multi-disciplinary research project brings together expertise in financial risk management 
and organisational psychology.  Our first objective was to produce a statistically validated survey 
instrument for assessing the risk culture in financial institutions; this is now well advanced.  Using the 
Macquarie University Risk Culture Scale we have examined risk culture in 113 business units across a 
range of business lines (retail/commercial, corporate banking and capital markets, wealth management 
etc) and countries (including Australia, Canada, Singapore, the U.K., and the U.S.).  In this article we 
present some early findings.
abstract
the what and why of culture
Culture matters to FIs because human behaviour is sensitive to context.  As new members join a group 
such as a FI, they quickly learn cultural norms from existing members.  This is typically achieved informally, 
by learning from the responses (both verbal and non-verbal) of respected others. Most of us learn how to 
behave by observing what others do rather than by reading procedure manuals.    Behaviour is kept in 
check by social circumstances because we don’t want to lose the approval of those around us.  
The ultimate objective is for employees to display risk behaviour that supports the organisation’s objectives. 
In our conceptual model (refer Figure 1), culture is distinct from but evidenced by behaviour:  what is 
discussed, what is focused on, what strategies are selected and decisions about recruitment, promotion 
and rewards.  
A strong risk culture is arguably the best way of producing desirable risk behaviour.  A ‘rules’ or ‘compliance’ 
based approach to risk management is fundamentally flawed; no set of rules is sufficiently comprehensive 
to cover every situation and devious, highly-motivated people can circumvent rules.
illustration #1: Conceptual model 
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Ultimately culture determines how we behave when we are under pressure and have to act instinctively, 
when there is no opportunity to review the rule book.  Culture also guides employees in how to balance 
competing objectives when there are multiple valid actions possible.  For all these reasons a strong risk 
culture should be more effective than rules alone in ensuring that the organisation’s objectives are reached.
Our approach to understanding and assessing risk culture has been informed by the research into industrial 
accidents and safety.  
Risk culture relates fundamentally to the perceptions of employees. The two main ways of gauging staff 
perceptions are to use interviews or surveys. Interviews can be very useful but in a large firm it is not 
practical to interview sufficient staff to create an adequate sample for analysis. In addition, interviews do not 
allow us to make objective comparisons over time or across businesses. 
However, implementation of the survey methodology presupposes a valid survey instrument – typically 
a questionnaire. Without a rigorous validation process, it is not clear what a questionnaire is measuring, 
if anything. A reliable survey instrument will allow financial institutions to test the uniformity of culture 
throughout the firm, identify pockets of ‘problematic’ culture, demonstrate the effectiveness of the culture 
(if it is strong) to outsiders and track how culture changes over time. 
The science of psychometrics is concerned with the construction and validation of assessment instruments 
for personality, intelligence, attitudes etc. By using the techniques of psychometrics one can create a 
survey instrument that is:
In order to assess risk culture we use the Macquarie University Risk Culture Scale.  The process of validation 
identified several underlying dimensions or factors of risk culture. A factor is a group of survey questions 
that measure one aspect of the issue of concern (e.g. risk culture).  Researchers examine the pattern of 
survey responses to find clusters of survey questions around a common theme. Statistical analysis of these 
correlations helps to identify what the factors are and which survey questions are relevant to each factor. 
Any survey questions that do not relate to the factors can be eliminated, thus reducing the number of 
questions.  For each risk factor there are multiple survey questions.  This is an important point because in 
a world of survey fatigue there is a natural desire in FIs to reduce survey length.  In some cases firms have 
attempted to use a single survey item for each dimension of risk culture.  Single item measures are not 
reliable and are unlikely to be effective in assessing risk culture.  
assessing risk culture
•  valid (i.e. measures what it purports to measure), 
•  reliable (i.e. will produce consistent results if repeated), 
• as short as possible to reduce survey fatigue, and 
• less likely to be gamed. 
050 Intelligent Risk - December, 2014 
The Macquarie University Risk Culture Scale was used to assess the culture in 113 business units across 
three large banks, two headquartered in Australia and one in CanadaNorth America.  All three banks have 
operations in multiple countries, they appear in the top 50 banks world-wide by market capitalisation and 
by assets.  More information about our methodology is available at www.be.mq.edu.au/risk_culture.
The main findings are as follows:
The Macquarie University Risk Culture Scale assesses four factors of risk culture as shown in Figure 2. 
findings so far
•  Strong risk culture (higher scores for Valued, Proactive, Manager and low scores for Avoidance) 
is generally associated with more desirable risk-related behaviour (e.g. speaking up) and less 
undesirable behaviour (e.g. manipulating controls).  This finding provides further validation of 
the importance of risk culture generally, and of the Macquarie University Risk Culture Scale as a 
means of assessing risk culture.
•  Personal characteristics are also important.  Staff with longer tenure, higher income, those  who 
are less risk tolerant and those with positive attitudes to risk management are more likely to 
display desirable risk-related behaviour.  Those with high personal risk tolerance are more likely 
to display undesirable risk related behaviour.
illustration #2: Four components or factors of risk culture
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• Good risk structures (policies, controls, IT systems, training, remuneration systems) appear 
to support strong culture and ultimately less undesirable risk behaviour.  Good risk structures 
do not, however, guarantee good behaviour.  Early results suggest that structures such as 
remuneration are interpreted through the lens of culture.
•  Senior staff tend to have a significantly more favourable perception of culture than junior staff. 
The most likely explanation for this is that ‘bad news’ is sometimes hidden from senior people. 
People with an unfavourable assessment of the culture may be disinclined to make those 
assessments public in fora where senior managers are present.  This highlights the importance 
of anonymous and independent risk culture assessments where staff feel safe to reveal their true 
beliefs. 
•  There are statistically significant differences between the risk culture of the three large banks we 
have analysed.  That is, we can rank them meaningfully in terms of the overall risk culture scores. 
This overall comparison may be misleading, however, because significant variations exist within 
each of the three banks.
•  The majority of business units we have assessed (more than 95% of 113) have an internally 
consistent perception of culture.  An “agreement index” or rwg is calculated to assess the 
extent that respondents within the business unit groupings were consistent in their ratings of risk 
culture.  That is, there is a strong or obvious culture in the unit (i.e. not just the perception of an 
individual but a quality of the group). However, it should be noted that there might be agreement 
that culture is good OR that it is poor. 
•  It is not possible to talk about uniform risk culture in any of these three banks because risk 
culture is a localised construct.  Attitudes and values will primarily be shaped by colleagues that 
we work closely with and by immediate managers.  In each of the large banks we have assessed 
so far, we have discovered individual business units that have risk culture scores significantly 
better or worse than the average for the bank.  Most variation in risk culture occurs at the 
business unit level and seems to be driven by the local team environment.  
As the research is ongoing and fully funded we are still offering free risk culture assessments to large 
financial institutions meeting our research criteria.  For further information please go to www.be.mq.edu.
au/risk_culture
We are also able to work in partnership with consulting groups.  If you have questions regarding the 
research project or our results, please contact Elizabeth Sheedy at esheedy@mafc.mq.edu.au
next steps
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For more information and to apply
for C-Suite Membership, click here.
Our new peer-to-peer program is designed to ensure that C-Suite 
members are connecting to others that are truly their counterparts, while
also gaining access to valuable content, resources, and opportunities.
Because the issues faced by our C-Suite members are at the highest level, our
programs are matched to their needs and moderated by those of similar
responsibility, skill and experience, within three levels of membership:
C-Suite | C-Suite Select | C-Suite Pinnacle 
PRMIA’S
C-SUITE MEMBERSHIP
054 Intelligent Risk - August, 2014 
by Jason Ackerman & Monica Dalwadi
a case study approach on how to 
leverage internal audit for success
Risk practitioners, your role just got more complex. Are you ready for the U.S. Office of Comptroller 
of the Currency’s proposed rulemaking? Your challenge will be putting together an ecosystem that 
delivers rigorous risk management systems, supported by talent to execute those systems, which 
combined reinforce transparent risk oversight. The proposed rules are just one of the challenges you 
will face. Your organization will still demand that risk management address evolving business needs. 
Leverage internal audits to help meet this challenge. The authors use concern about loan loss reserves 
to illustrate what internal audits bring to the table, and suggest other risk management and internal audit 
collaboration opportunities. These opportunities deliver what boards increasingly ask for: connecting 
the dots on assurance, compliance, and risk management information to define and shape business 
decisions.
overview
Risk management evolved with changing business needs to deliver additional value to organizations. 
Similarly, many internal audit functions have begun to evolve to be more strategic and forward-looking 
such that they understand processes and offer an objective perspective on ways to increase efficiency 
and minimize risk exposure. To keep pace, internal audit functions might have to spend less time 
auditing pure financial transactions, and focus on reviewing processes, analyzing data for insights, and 
identifying potential risks.
looking ahead
Assignment of risk-management roles and responsibilities to frontline units, independent risk   
management, and internal auditing
Defined talent management and succession planning with each of the three lines of defense
Alignment of the three lines of defense with compensation management
Oversight of the risk management framework by boards of directors.
Similarly, the risk-management framework is expected to require institutions to include:
Further collaboration among risk management and internal audits addresses these requirements, along 
with evaluations of organizational risks in a way that saves organizations time, money, and resources. 
This degree of collaboration reinforces the maturation of risk oversight for boards of directors. Surveys of 
directors indicate they want to see this more keenly in practice. 
Our opinion is that internal audit functions will be both part of the risk management ecosystem and 
tasked with providing validation of the execution of risk management responsibilities by frontline units and 
management. This will position internal auditing in a complex and perhaps new role. Regardless of the 
industry, comprehensive understanding of and the ability to identify departures from the risk management 
framework will be essential. By collaborating, risk management and internal auditing highlight such issues 
to senior leaders and the board.
Further transformation in both risk management and internal audit activities will likely be influenced by the 
recent U.S. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency’s (OCC) notice of proposed rulemaking that would 
mandate:
•  Formalized documentation;
• Specific roles and responsibilities for all three lines of defense;
• A risk-appetite statement that aligns with the strategic plan;
• Aggregate, concentration, and frontline risks;
•  Risk escalation and resolution protocols;
•  Risk data aggregation and reporting;
•  Talent, compensation, and performance management programs that align with risk appetite and 
management.
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Leading organizations discovered that when risk management and internal auditing collaborate, they 
achieve:
We explore an example to demonstrate how collaboration works.
intersection of risk management and internal auditing
example: Allowance for Loan and Lease Losses (ALLL) 
EFFICIENCIES BETTER 
DECISION-MAKING
IMPROVED
RESULTS
A risk manager is concerned about the adequacy of and supporting documentation for the ALLL at his 
mortgage company; they are not as robust as he saw at his prior organization. As a new manager, he 
does not want to assume that since something is different, it is inappropriate. He has also not finished his 
business case to add more resources to his small team. At an introductory meeting with internal auditing, 
he raises a question to the chief audit executive about the last review of the ALLL process. Given the time 
that has passed since the last formal audit, the chief audit executive decides to include ALLL in his audit 
plan, and uses information provided by the risk manager as one data point during the review.  
Assess internal controls
Internal auditing assesses internal controls by reviewing the 
ALLL calculation, methodology, and corporate credit policy. This 
includes inquiries of management and other company personnel 
regarding changes to ALLL. They walk through the process and 
compare practices in the contexts of FFIEC and U.S. GAAP. 
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If this risk manager’s story does not resonate with you, consider if the following do:
Test transactions and analyze results
They test transactions, including detailed testing of ALLL inputs 
and outputs, and conduct sensitivity testing and scenario 
analyses. They perform detailed testing on the loss given default 
query and on impairment analysis. The goal of the analysis is to 
determine whether the calculations and supporting documents 
are thorough. 
Reporting
Results of the audit move the organization forward concerning:
•  Refining impairment estimation
•  Enhancing documentation of the process, method, and 
results of the ALLL methodology:
• Are there departments in which you believe there are broader risk issues and control validation 
needed (e.g., a repeat insurance-related matter in an office might indicate broader management 
issues)?
•  Are there decentralized processes that link to risk management (e.g., claims reporting)?
•  Does the organization require confirmation that processes are followed consistently (e.g., 
international programs)?
•  Are there are areas in which an additional voice to senior leaders or the board is needed (i.e., are 
additional control measures needed)?
 º to establish a baseline rate to comply with regulatory 
requirements (e.g., OCC) and changes over the past 
several years
 º to establish a baseline rate to comply with regulatory requirements (e.g., OCC) and 
changes over the past several years
 º because historic losses do not represent real losses, establishing a baseline rate to 
comply with regulatory requirements
 º to include procedures to compare historic losses with peer groups
 º because some queries produced errors, resulting in overstated beginning balances in 
pools, and double counting.
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A number of intersections exist at which risk management and internal auditing can working together more 
proactively, including:
In those cases in which risk management has insufficient resources, internal auditing is helpful when 
evaluating processes and internal controls, and considering the likelihood of breakdown, during the 
following types of audits: 
Organizations are finding purposeful ways to connect with not only risk management and internal auditing, 
but also legal and compliance functions (we did not have the space in this article to broach this topic). 
If there are patterns of behaviors, issues, or opportunities, they can share information timely and plan 
together. Increasingly, boards and audit committees are searching for this link, but they do not want to 
connect the dots; they hope that those in the organization break down silos and connect the dots for them.
conclusion
how else might internal auditing and risk management cooperate?
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• Facilitating enterprise risk management
•  Performing joint risk assessment
•  Collaborating on findings and issues throughout the year
•  Joint training or team-building to cross-fertilize skills and experience
•  Financial audits
•  Compliance audits
•  Operational audits
•  Technology audits
• Business process reengineering
• Fraud investigations
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• Align your company with thought 
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and regionally through chapter 
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learning opportunities
In the current environment risk education is not just a choice, it is a necessity.
PRMIA provides open enrollment and customized classroom training, using leading academic instructors 
and practitioners who are experts in their fields.
Please contact us if you are interested to learn more about our customized classroom training programs.
OPERATIONAL RISK MASTERCLASS: MEASUREMENT, MANAGEMENT, AND LEADERSHIP
Featuring Russell Walker
Chicago / April 23-24, 2015, 8:30 A.M. - 5:30 P.M. 
COUNTERPARTY CREDIT RISK: THEORY, IMPLEMENTATION AND PRACTICE
Led by Jon Gregory, Giampaolo Gabbi, Alonso Pena, Giacomo De Laurentis
Milano - Italy / February 4-6, 2015, 9:00 A.M. – 5:00 P.M.
A COMPLETE COURSE IN RISK MANAGEMENT
Offered jointly by PRMIA and Imperial College London 
London / March 23-27, 2015, 9:00 A.M. – 5:00 P.M.
A COMPLETE COURSE IN RISK MANAGEMENT
Offered jointly by PRMIA and Kellogg School of Management 
Chicago / July 20-24, 2015, 8:30 A.M
ADVANCED FUNDAMENTALS OF FINANCIAL RISK MANAGEMENT
Offered jointly by PRMIA & Fordham University 
New York / March 16-18, 2015, 9:00 A.M. – 5:30 P.M.
UPCOMING CLASSROOM COURSES ARE LISTED FOR YOU BELOW.
More details here
More details here
More details here
More details here
More details here
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submission guidelines
Article submissions for future issues of Intelligent Risk are actively invited. Articles should be approximately 1,000–1,500 words, 
single spaced, and cover a topic of interest to PRMIA members. Please consult the submission guidelines located at the end of 
the publication prior to submitting your article. Please send all article submissions that you wish to be considered for publication to 
iRisk@prmia.org. Chosen pieces will be featured in future issues of iRisk, archived on PRMIA.org, and promoted throughout the 
PRMIA. community.
Please follow these recommendations in the interests of meeting PRMIA’s publication standards, and to accelerate both the 
evaluation and editorial process. The review process will take up to 4-8 weeks. The author will receive articles due for revision, as 
well as those while accepted, departs in large part from these guidelines. 
Finally, PRMIA reserves the right to return to an author for reformatting purposes, any article, which is accepted for publication 
that deviates from the aforementioned standards. The editors always reserve the right to make further changes to your work for 
consistency and coherence.
Article Submission - Please send all article submissions that 
you wish to be considered for publication to iRisk@prmia.org
File Format - Please prepare your work using Microsoft Word, 
with any images inserted as objects into the document prior 
to submission.
Abstract - Please present a brief summary or abstract of the 
paper on the page following the title page.
Author Biography - Please include a biography, not exceeding 
150 words, for each of the contributing authors listed. All 
biographies must be included at the end of the article. 
Author Photo - Please provide a professional photograph to 
be included with your article. The photo must be submitted as 
a separate file in jpeg or tiff format. 
Exhibits - Remember to attach all elements relevant to the 
paper (tables, graphs, charts and photos) on separate and 
individual pages at the end of the article. Please denote all 
tabular and graphical materials as Exhibits, and designate 
them using Arabic numerals, successively in order of 
appearance in the text. 
Exhibit Presentation - Please ensure that tables and other 
supplementary materials are organized and presented 
consistently throughout the paper, because they will be 
published as is. You may submit exhibits produced either in 
color or black and white. Use the exact same language in 
consecutive appearances; indicate all bold-faced or italicized 
entries in exhibits; arrange numbers consistently by decimal 
points; use the same number of decimal points for the same 
types of numbers; center headings, columns, and numbers 
correctly; and incorporate any source notes when required. 
Consistency of fonts, capitalization, and abbreviations in 
graphs throughout the paper is required, and all axes and 
lines in graphs must be labeled in a consistent and coherent 
manner. Paste all graphs into Word documents as objects, 
and not as images, allowing access to the original graph. 
Please supply source materials for graphs such as Excel files.
Equations - Please present equations on separate lines. All 
equations must be aligned with the paragraph indents, but 
not followed by any punctuation. Use Arabic numerals at 
the right-hand margin to number equations consecutively 
throughout the article. Use brackets to indicate all operation 
signs, Greek letters, or other such notations that may be 
ambiguous. 
Reference Citations - In-text citations of authors and works 
must be represented as: Smith (2000). Use parenthesis for the 
year, not brackets. Similarly, references within parentheses 
must be represented as: “(see also Smith, 2000).”
References List - A reference is a source that is actually cited 
in the text. Please formally list only articles previously cited, 
using a separate alphabetical references list at the end of the 
article. 
Author Guidelines - PRMIA categorically values literary 
excellence in selecting articles for publication. To enhance 
clarity and coherence, we urge the use of simple sentences 
comprising of a minimal number of syllables per word.
 
Follow these instructions regarding the format of your articles and references. 
I-RISK SUBMISSION GUIDELINES
CALL FOR ARTICLES
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